Causal learning across culture and socioeconomic status

Extensive research has explored the ability of young children to learn about the causal structure of the world from patterns of evidence. These studies, however, have been conducted with middle-class samples from North America and Europe. In the present study, low-income Peruvian 4- and 5-year-olds and adults, low-income U.S. 4- and 5-year-olds in Head Start programs, and middle-class children from the United States participated in a causal learning task (N = 435). Consistent with previous studies, children learned both specific causal relations and more abstract causal principles across culture and socioeconomic status (SES). The Peruvian children and adults generally performed like middle-class U.S. children and adults, but the low-SES U.S. children showed some differences

Environmental and genetic influences on neurocognitive development: the importance of multiple methodologies and time-dependent intervention

Genetic mutations and environmental factors dynamically influence gene expression and developmental trajectories at the neural, cognitive, and behavioral levels. The examples in this article cover different periods of neurocognitive development—early childhood, adolescence, and adulthood—and focus on studies in which researchers have used a variety of methodologies to illustrate the early effects of socioeconomic status and stress on brain function, as well as how allelic differences explain why some individuals respond to intervention and others do not. These studies highlight how similar behaviors can be driven by different underlying neural processes and show how a neurocomputational model of early development can account for neurodevelopmental syndromes, such as autism spectrum disorders, with novel implications for intervention. Finally, these studies illustrate the importance of the timing of environmental and genetic factors on development, consistent with our view that phenotypes are emergent, not predetermined

Looking Beyond Looks: Comments on Sloutsky, Kloos, and Fisher (2007)

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/75080/1/j.1467-9280.2007.01937.x.pd

Children's suggestibility in relation to their understanding about sources of knowledge

In the experiments reported here, children chose either to maintain their initial belief about an object's identity or to accept the experimenter's contradicting suggestion. Both 3– to 4–year–olds and 4– to 5–year–olds were good at accepting the suggestion only when the experimenter was better informed than they were (implicit source monitoring). They were less accurate at recalling both their own and the experimenter's information access (explicit recall of experience), though they performed well above chance. Children were least accurate at reporting whether their final belief was based on what they were told or on what they experienced directly (explicit source monitoring). Contrasting results emerged when children decided between contradictory suggestions from two differentially informed adults: Three– to 4–year–olds were more accurate at reporting the knowledge source of the adult they believed than at deciding which suggestion was reliable. Decision making in this observation task may require reflective understanding akin to that required for explicit source judgments when the child participates in the task

The Search for Invariance: Repeated Positive Testing Serves the Goals of Causal Learning

Positive testing is characteristic of exploratory behavior, yet it seems to be at odds with the aim of information seeking. After all, repeated demonstrations of one’s current hypothesis often produce the same evidence and fail to distinguish it from potential alternatives. Research on the development of scientific reasoning and adult rule learning have both documented and attempted to explain this behavior. The current chapter reviews this prior work and introduces a novel theoretical account—the Search for Invariance (SI) hypothesis—which suggests that producing multiple positive examples serves the goals of causal learning. This hypothesis draws on the interventionist framework of causal reasoning, which suggests that causal learners are concerned with the invariance of candidate hypotheses. In a probabilistic and interdependent causal world, our primary goal is to determine whether, and in what contexts, our causal hypotheses provide accurate foundations for inference and intervention—not to disconfirm their alternatives. By recognizing the central role of invariance in causal learning, the phenomenon of positive testing may be reinterpreted as a rational information-seeking strategy

Mind the Gap: Investigating Toddlers’ Sensitivity to Contact Relations in Predictive Events

Toddlers readily learn predictive relations between events (e.g., that event A predicts event B). However, they intervene on A to try to cause B only in a few contexts: When a dispositional agent initiates the event or when the event is described with causal language. The current studies look at whether toddlers’ failures are due merely to the difficulty of initiating interventions or to more general constraints on the kinds of events they represent as causal. Toddlers saw a block slide towards a base, but an occluder prevented them from seeing whether the block contacted the base; after the block disappeared behind the occluder, a toy connected to the base did or did not activate. We hypothesized that if toddlers construed the events as causal, they would be sensitive to the contact relations between the participants in the predictive event. In Experiment 1, the block either moved spontaneously (no dispositional agent) or emerged already in motion (a dispositional agent was potentially present). Toddlers were sensitive to the contact relations only when a dispositional agent was potentially present. Experiment 2 confirmed that toddlers inferred a hidden agent was present when the block emerged in motion. In Experiment 3, the block moved spontaneously, but the events were described either with non-causal (“here’s my block”) or causal (“the block can make it go”) language. Toddlers were sensitive to the contact relations only when given causal language. These findings suggest that dispositional agency and causal language facilitate toddlers’ ability to represent causal relationships.John Templeton Foundation (#12667)James S. McDonnell Foundation (Causal Learning Collaborative Initiative)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Career Award (# 0744213

It's just a feeling: why economic models do not explain

Julian Reiss correctly identified a trilemma about economic models: we cannot maintain that they are false, but nevertheless explain and that only true accounts explain. In this reply we give reasons to reject the second premise – that economic models explain. Intuitions to the contrary should be distrusted